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The article analyzes how the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) has developed
throughout the sovereign debt crisis. The author concludes that the ECB acted, so far, within
the limits of its competences. However, he recognizes that this judgment is built on a rather
“aggressive” interpretation of the TFEU and the statute of the ECB. The author is very
sceptical that the existence of the modified EFSF and ESMwill allow the ECB to stop buying
sovereign bonds in secondary markets. He outlines the structure of a potential future Fiscal
Union including Eurobonds.
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I. Introduction
1. Outline of the legal questions related to the SMP
The Securities Market Programme (SMP) of the ECB was first established in
May 2010 as an emergency reaction to the eruption of the Greek crisis fol-
lowed by the Irish and the Portuguese crisis.1 Subject to that programme the
ECB purchased on the secondary market sovereign bonds issued by distressed
Euro Area Member States. In the first half of the year 2011 the SMP came to a
standstill, but was reactivated and extended in August 2011.2 Only days after
the ECB started for the first time to buy Spanish and Italian sovereign bonds,
Ottmar Issing, one of the godfather of the Euro, wrote this harsh critic in the
Financial Times3: “A monetary union with a stable euro can only survive if
central bank independence is fully respected. This implies that the ECB ab-
stains from fiscal policy actions (such as buying sovereign bonds in secondary
markets). Yet to change the “no bail-out” clause ever more in the direction of a
bail-out regime is not a step towards a democratically-legitimised political
union.”
From a legal perspective Issing’s straight forward statement raises at least three
fundamental questions: (1) Does the Securities Market Program (SMP) pose a
serious risk to the independence of the ECB (Art. 130 TFEU)? (2) Does the
SMP expose the Euro Area Member States to a bail out risk, thereby violating
Art. 125 (1) TFEU? (3) Can the SMP result in a breach of the ban on monetary
financing of governments (Art. 123 TFEU)?
Without addressing the much broader topic, whether or not the SMP was
democratically legitimized and on the long run effective, one can hardly deny
that the SMP is indeed threatening the ECB’s independence. As a major sov-
ereign creditor the independence of the ECB gets vulnerable in several ways.
1 Decision of the ECB of 14 May 2010 establishing a securities market programme (ECB/
2010/0), Offical Journal EU, 20. 5. 2010 L 124/8 (http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/
l_12420100520en00080009.pdf).
2 See http://www.centralbanknews.info/2011/08/european-central-bank-signals-expan
sion.html
3 Issing, Slithering to the wrong kind of Union, Financial Times, 8. 8. 2011 (http://www.
ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c4159b34-c1a8-11e0-acb3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1mFeLpNbi);
see also Issing, Die Währungsunion im Spannungsfeld von Politik und Ökonomie, EWS
2011, 257 ff.
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In case of a sovereign default the ECB will face mounting political pressure to
accept waivers and haircuts. This is not only a theoretical concern, but became
reality in the first quarter of the year 2012, when the negotiations between
Greece and its private creditors (basically financial institutions holding Greek
bonds) about a voluntary haircut reached a decisive point. Influential econo-
mists like for instance Wolfgang Franz, who is a member of the government
relatedGermanCouncil of Economic Expert4 (hence a so-called “Wirtschafts-
weiser”), called for a participation of the ECB in the debt restructuring proc-
ess.5 If such a participation will take place, and if the agreed “haircut” on the
nominal value will reduce the ECB’s real claim against Greece to an amount
which is going to be lower then the price, the ECB paid when purchasing the
original Greek bonds in the secondary market, than the bank will need to
absorb significant losses. Furthermore, accepting such a deep haircut would
result in a violation of the ban on monetary financing (Art. 123 TFEU).6
As a major creditor of distressed Euro Area Member States the ECB runs
automatically into a conflict of interest: Like all creditors of sovereign bonds
the ECB will have a natural interest in a strong economic performance of its
debtor, hence it will appreciate if not foster high GDP growth and low un-
employment rates. This interest causes naturally tensions with regard to the
concept of the ECB as enshrined in Art. 127 (1) TFEU. Said sacrosanct rule
determines a clear and simple target hierarchy for the ECB’s monetary policy:
first comes price stability! The ECB has no mandate to foster labour market
performance or growth (on the expense of a higher inflation rate).
However, the sacrosanct policy target “price stability” is not only threatened
by a potential conflict of interests caused by the SMP, but also by a moral
hazard problem triggered by the very same programme. It is clear from the
outset that monetary stability of the Euro Area depends on fiscal discipline of
each and every member state. If the market for bonds of a specific sovereign
issuer dries up, this will send a clear message to the respective member state:
Restore investors’ confidence via budget discipline and improved competitive-
ness or you will get no more refinancing (“rolling”) of the accumulated debt
load! The price of its bonds in the secondary market is the essential signal for
the interest rate a bond issuer needs to offer when placing new bonds in the
primarymarkets. Given the fact that sovereign bond issuers (almost) never pay
back their debt load but just “roll” it into the future, their solvency depends on
the ability to constantly place new bonds in the primary market (ideally at
4 http://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/index.html?&L=1
5 http://www.deutsche-mittelstands-nachrichten.de/2012/01/37140/
6 See below II 2 and Atkins, Financial Times 16. 11. 2011, ECN under strain as political
masters bicker (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/402b158c-1073-11e1-8298-00144
feabdc0.html#axzz1mFeLpNbi)
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favourable conditions). Consequently secondary markets have a disciplining
effect on politicians.
But if politicians of a sovereign debtor, who is used to lax fiscal discipline, can
rely on the assumption that the ECB will step in as a buyer of last resort, the
reform pressure exerted by market forces will diminish and politicians of the
over-indebted state will continue to spend above the level of national tax
revenues. We all remember that only days after the ECB began to buy for
the first time Italian bonds in summer 2011 the government of Ex-President
Berlusconi started to relax the previously promised austerity programme.7
However, from a legal point of view it is very difficult to make a judgement on
whether or not the institutional guarantee8 of central bank independence has
been violated by a specific monetary policymeasure taken by the central banks
itself. Raising this question poses in itself a challenge to central bank inde-
pendence. Central banks must enjoy a huge leeway9 – particularly in an un-
precedented crisis – and should not be policed by turning their institutional
guarantee of independence into a judicial corrective. Therefore this article will
focus on the second and third question raised by Issing. Hence it will be
discussed if the SMP creates a severe bail-out risk conflicting with Art. 125
(1) TFEU. Furthermore it will be analysed if the permanent European Stabil-
ity Mechanism (ESM) – as agreed in January 201210 – is capable to free the
ECB from such a potential bail-out risk and the need to act itself as a sovereign
bond purchaser of last resort.
2. From the EFSF to the ESM
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created by the euro area
Member States following a decision taken on May 9, 2010 within the frame-
work of the Ecofin Council. The EFSF’s mandate is to safeguard financial
7 Atkins, Eurozone crisis: A deft to buy time, Financial Times, 7. 2. 2012 (http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a7ade85e-5184-11e1-a99d-00144feabdc0.html).
8 See Zilioli/Selmayr, TheConstitutional Status of the EuropeanCentral Bank, CMLRev.
2007, 355–399.
9 In order to get an idea of how the ECB interprets the independence rule see for instance
ECB Opinion of 1 July 210 on the remuneration of the staff of Banca Nationala a
Romaniei (CON/2010/51); ECB Opinion of 25 March 2010 on independence, confi-
dentiality and the prohibition of monetary financing (CON/2010/25); ECBOpinion of
14 July 2009 on the taxation of Banca d’Italia’s gold reserves (COM/2009/59); ECB
Opinion of 18 May 2009 on measures on public sector remuneration with regard to
central bank independence (COM/2009/47); see also Zilioli/Selmayr, The Constitu-
tional Status of the European Central Bank, CML Rev. 2007, 355, 368–368.
10 See http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/esm_treaty_en.pdf
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stability in Europe by providing financial assistance to Euro Area Member
States.11 The Facility was established in an emergency reaction to the eruption
of the Greek crisis, followed by the Irish and the Portuguese crisis. Originally
it has been equipped with a limited volume and few intervention tools. Basi-
cally the EFSF was empowered to grant loans to troubled states which rank
pari passu with private sector claims.12 Intervention in securities markets was
not part of the original tool box.
However, it was clear from the outset that the EFSF would serve as an interim
solution only. Particularly the German government insisted on a mechanism
that would include private sector involvement.13 Hence the Euro Area Mem-
ber States soon started to design the ESM which should become a permanent
European institution. At that time it was planned that the ESMwill replace the
EFSF from 2013 on.14 But the dynamics of the crisis forced the Eurozone
Member States to reform even the interim solution, the EFSF, only one year
after its establishment.15 The reform became effective in autumn 2011. Since
then the EFSF is empowered to intervene in primary and/or secondary mar-
kets for sovereign bonds. Intervention in the secondary market can only take
place on the basis of an ECB analysis recognizing the existence of exceptional
financial market circumstances and risks to financial stability.
On the occasion of their 2012 January summit the Euro Area Member States
singed the ESM-Treaty, the basis for a permanent European rescue fund.16
Given the depth of the sovereign debt crisis and the insufficiency of funds
provided by theEFSF, the contracting states agreed to pre-pone the operational
start of theESMfrom2013 tomid2012. In the light of the ongoingdiscussion to
increase the funds of theESM it is likely thatESMMember Stateswill decide on
the occasion of their next summit in March 2012 to run both rescue funds
simultaneously. Previously it was planned that the ESMwill replace the EFSF.
Concerning the sovereign bond market the new ESM will have similar inter-
vention rights as the reformed EFSF. Consequently the rescue funds, should at
least theoretically be able to replace the ECB’s controversial SMP.
Both rescue funds are based on intergovernmental agreements, hence interna-
tional treaties. The funds are established as sociétés anonymes in Luxemburg
with full legal capacity but without a bank license. The rational for the shift
11 http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm
12 See the introduction to the functioning of the EFSF by Regling, Aufgaben und Her-
ausforderungen des EFSF, EWS 2011, 261 ff.
13 Sester, Beteiligung von privaten Investoren im Rahmen des ESM, WM 2011, 1057 ff.
14 European Council, EUCO 10/11 of 20. 4. 2011 (http://register.consilium.europa.eu/
pdf/de/11/st00/st00010-re01.en11.pdf).
15 European Council, 24/25 March 2011, EUCO 10/11, Co EUR 6, CONCL 3, p. 6
16 See http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/esm_treaty_en.pdf
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towards an intergovernmental organization instead of creating a new Euro-
pean institution (established on the basis of the European Treaties) has been
the lack of time to amend the treaties and the political risk inherent in each
alteration of the treaties. The latter has been considered by many governments
to be particularly high in the face of the current severe crisis and a furious
population. However, what seemed to be a politically the unavoidable second
best solution disclosed its shortcomings very fast if not right from the start.
When it became necessary to redesign the EFSF-Agreement only one year
after its conclusion, it turned out that the necessary consent of all 17 parties to
the treaty (particularly the approval by national parliaments) was almost as
difficult to achieve as an amendment of the European Treaties (TEU/TFEU).
Furthermore the institutional shift has given rise to at least two fundamental
concerns: (1) the unclear relation between the rescue funds on the one side and
the existing EU institutions and the provisions of the European Treaties on the
other side; (2) the lack of democratic control on the EU level. The first concern
will be addressed in detail. The latter one is part of the broad and challenging
task to design a legitimized Fiscal Union for the post crisis world; a topic that
can only be outlined at the end of this article.
3. Policy changebyMarioDraghi: focusingonLTROinsteadof increasingSMP
The most significant policy change Mario Draghi made short after he had
followed Jean Claude Trichet as president of the ECB was the launch of
two massive Longer Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO).17 Draghi’s idea
has been to make an unprecedented offer to the banks of cheap (but secured)
loans lasting three years in any quantities they liked. The aimwas to provide “a
wall of money” to shield the banking system from a liquidity crunch. Accord-
ing to Financial Times journalist Ralph Atkins, the assumption or hope that
Euro Area banks might use the funds to invest in high-yield bonds of dis-
tressed governments was discussed on various occasions by council members
but was not part of the official justification.18 The LTROs were announced on
December 8, 2011.19 The first operation was completed on December 20, 2011
and the second one will be completed on February 28, 2012. The total allot-
ment of three-years loans during the first LTRO amounted to 5 489bn (equiv-
alent to 5 per cent of eurozone cross-domestic product).
17 See Linzert/Nautz/Bindseil, The Longer Term Refinancing Operations of the ECB,
ECB Working Paper Series NO. 359/May 2004 (http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/
scpwps/ecbwp359.pdf).
18 Atkins, Eurozone crisis: A deft way to buy time, Financial Times, February 8, 2012, p. 7.
19 ECB Press Release, 8 December 2011 (http://www.ecb.eu/press/pr/date/2011/html/
pr111208_1.en.html).
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Given the fact that banks can only participate in LTRO as along as they can
offer sufficient eligible assets as collateral the ECB combined its announce-
ment of the three-years LTROs with a change of collateral rules20: First the
rating threshold for certain asset-backed securities (ABS) has been reduced,
and second the ECB has been allowing national central banks (NCBs), as a
temporary solution, to accept as collateral additional performing credit claims
(i.e. bank loans) that satisfy specific eligibility criteria.21 On February 9, 2012
the ECB published the information that the ECB’s Governing Council has
approved, for the seven NCBs (Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Austria
and Portugal) that have put forward relevant proposals, specific national eli-
gibility criteria and risk control measures for the temporary acceptance of
additional credit claims as collateral in Eurosystem credit operations.22 Subject
to the ordinary collateral rules only assets with a probability of default of less
than 0.4% are qualified as eligible assets, sevenNCBs are no accepting (at least
for the next 12 months) also assets with a probability of default up to 1% or
even 1.5%. As a consequence of this change an additional amount of EUR 600
to 700bn assets could be offered as collateral in the second LTRO round.
However, ECB President Mario Draghi announced in a press conference on
February 9, 2012 that the haircut (or over-collateralisation) applied to the
riskier assets will be much higher as in the ordinary case. The haircut could
amount up to 2/3 of the nominal/market value, reducing the additional bor-
rowing capacity to EUR 200bn.23 The downside of the new scheme, from the
20 ECB-Decision of 14 December 2011 on additional temporary measures relating to
Eurosystem refinancing operations and eligibility of collateral (ECB/2011/05).
21 ECB Press Release of 8 December 2011 – ECB announces measures to support bank
lending and money market activity (http://www.ecb.eu/press/pr/date/2011/html/
pr111208_1.en.html); ECB-Decision of 14 December 2011 on additional temporary
measures relating to Eurosystem refinancing operations and eligibility of collateral
(ECB/2011/05), Art. 4 (1) An NCB may accept as collateral for Eurosystem monetary
policy operations credit claims that do not satisfy the Eurosystem eligibility criteria. (2)
The NCBs shall establish eligibility criteria and risk control measures for accepting
credit claims pursuant to paragraph 1. Such eligibility criteria and risk control measures
shall be subject to prior approval by the Governing Council.
22 ECB Press Release of 9 February 2012 – ECB’s Governing Council approves criteria
for additional credit claims (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/
pr120209_2.en.html); see also Introductory statement to the press conference (with
Q&A) and transcript of the questions asked and the answers given by Mario Draghi,
President of the ECB, and Vítor Constâncio Vice-President of the ECB, 9 February
2012 (http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120209.en.html).
23 Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A) and transcript of the ques-
tions asked and the answers given by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, and Vítor
Constâncio Vice-President of the ECB, 9 February 2012 (http://www.ecb.int/press/
pressconf/2012/html/is120209.en.html): “if I am not mistaken (. . .), we have from about
600 to 700bn euro as the estimated amount of credit claims, of which only 200bn euro
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perspective of the seven NCBs applying the weaker standard, is that these
NCBs will have to bear the additional credit risks (default and loss given
default) directly themselves. Hence, if a bank that has borrowed money from
the ECB goes into default and losses are incurred, there will be no sharing of
burden with other NCBs of the Euro Area.24
The move from the controversial SMP to massive LTROs has, at least from a
strategic perspective, a clear advantage for Mr. Draghi and the majority of the
ECB’s Governing Council: When conducting LTROs the ECBs is acting
straight forward as a liquidity provider of last resort for the banking sector,
which is a role that clearly falls within the competences and responsibilities of
the ECB. Consequently Mr. Draghi could escape the continuous critic of the
German central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) which saw the SMP right from
the start as a move to break a rule which has been sacrosanct for generations of
German central bankers: the ban on central banks financing governments
(Art. 123 TFEU). However, excessive lending to private banks in combination
with relaxed collateral rules obviously increases the risks of the ECB, NCBs
and their owners. Furthermore “too generous” liquidity provisions could
create the wrong incentives for euro area banks, storing up inflation risks
for the future.25 And if banks participating in the LTROs are investing the
extra liquidity in high-yield bonds of distressed governments, which they use
subsequently in reversed transaction or as collateral in new credit transactions
with the ECB, it becomes evident that the LTROs have very similar effects on
the balance sheet of the ECB as the SMP. In fact, the described mechanism can
be classified as backdoor leveraging.26
Anyway, changing the focus to LTROs does not mean that the SMP is history.
First of all it was never officially terminated and can be increased any time.
And second, the already purchased sovereign (junk) bonds are still there spoil-
ing the ECB’s balance sheet.
plus would become acceptable, because of the strong over-collateralisation we ask for.”;
see also Proissl, EZB begrenzt Risiken aus Bankenhilfe, Financial Times Deutschland,
10. 2. 2012 (http://www.ftd.de/print-archiv/artikel/2028192?mode=print).
24 See Atkins, Eurozone crisis: A deft way to buy time, Financial Times, February 7, 2012,
p. 3.
25 Atkins/Watkins, Germans concerned over Drahi liquidity offer, 9. 2. 2012 (http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f7a0b748-5345-11e1-aafd-00144feabdc0.html).
26 See below II 1.
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II. Does the SMP create a bail out risk contrary to Art. 125 (1) TFEU?
1. SMP – recapitalisation of the ECB – “backdoor” bail-out
For the time being it is too early to predict the long term financial consequence
of the SMP for the ECB. So far one can only make a rather trivial statement:
the ultimate financial result of the bond-buying programme will depend on
the future of the bond issuers. If the issuing countries will be able to pay
interests and principle without a dept restructuring programme (including
haircuts on outstanding principal, direct or indirect interest cuts resulting
from a prolongation without an increase of the interest rate) then the ECB
and its owners, the Euro Area Member States, are safe. In this case the ECB
can either re-sell the bonds in the market or hold them to maturity. Both
options may even result in a net profit if the respective issuers return to a
sustainable fiscal path and investors regain trust.
But if the issuer can not return to such a sustainable path without a tough dept
restructuring programme including haircuts or prolongation of maturity then
the ECB will suffer losses. Subject to the ECB-Statute such losses will be ab-
sorbed by using the general reserve fund (Art. 33.1 ECB-Statute). If not suffi-
cient its monetary income, hence the ECB’s currency reserves will be used.
Ultimately member states will need to recapitalize the ECB. Although some
economists state that (classical) central banks may operate perfectly well with-
out capital as conventionally defined they concede that a large negative net
worth, is likely to compromise central bank independence and interfere with
its ability to attain policy objectives.27 If society values an independent central
bank capable of effectively implementing monetary policy, as it is common
conviction in Europe, central bank recapitalization may become essential.28
The latter should be particularly true with regard to the unique legal nature of
the ECB, which is a kind of “stock corporation” owned by sovereign share-
holders, the Member States of the Euro Area (Art. 28 ECB-Statute).
If the necessity to recapitalize the ECB arises as a direct consequence of the
SMP in combination with a following voluntary debt restructuring, such re-
27 Stella, ILF Working Paper WP/97/83, Do Central Banks Need Capital?, 2005 http://
www.perjacobsson.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9783.pdf; for recommendations on
how recapitalization of central banks can ce done in practice see Dalton/Dziobek,
IMF Working Paper WP/05/72, Central Bank Losses and Experiences in Selected
Countries.
28 Stella, ILF Working Paper WP/97/83, Do Central Banks Need Capital?, 2005 http://
www.perjacobsson.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9783.pdf; for an example of a central
bank recapitalization law see Law No. 167-07 for the Recapitalization of the Central
Bank of the Dominican Republic http://www.creditopublico.gov.do/ingles/Legal%20
Framework/law/Recapitalization%20Law_167-07.pdf
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capitalization can be qualified (at least) as a “backdoor” bail-out and indirect
monetary financing of governments. The attribution of a bail-out risk to SMP
is not only a theoretical perception. In contrast, it is a matter of fact that could
be clearly observed in the sovereign bond markets during the crisis. Immedi-
ately after the ECB reactivated the SMP in Mid-2011, the prices for Credit
Default Swaps for 5 years German bonds rose significantly.29 The rise was even
stronger in the case of Credit Default Swaps for the equivalent French bonds.30
CDS yields for 5 years sovereign bonds are widely considered as a good
indicator for medium term country risk.31 Hence, there is empirical evidence
for the statement that, subject tomarket perception, the SMP poses indeed a de
facto bail out risk.
2. Legal basis for the SMP
According to the decision of the ECB on the establishment of the SMP its legal
basis is rooted in these articles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union and the ECB-Statute:
Art. 127 (2) TFEU (equivalent to Art. 3.1 ECB-Statute):
The basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB shall be: – to define and implement the
monetary policy of the Union (. . .).
Art. 12.1 (2) ECB-Statute:
The Executive Board shall implement monetary policy in accordance with the guidelines and
decisions laid down by the Governing Council. In doing so the Executive Board shall give the
necessary instructions to national central banks. (. . .)
Art. 18.1 ECB-Statute:
In order to achieve the objectives of the ESCB and to carry out its tasks, the ECB and the national
central banks may: – operate in the financial markets by buying and selling outright (. . .).
As a matter of fact Art. 18.1 ECB-Statute empowers the ECB to buy and sell
outright securities in financial markets if these transactions help to achieve
the objectives of the ECB, hence help to implement the monetary policy as
defined by the ECB’s Governing Council. When taking its decision to
launch the SMP in May 2010, the ECB consequently brought forward the
argument that intervention in secondary markets is justified whenever ten-
sions in those markets are hampering the monetary transmission mechanism
29 http://m.faz.net/aktuell/finanzen/anleihen-zinsen/kreditversicherungen-praemien-
deutscher-papiere-steigen-stark-11115152.html
30 http://m.faz.net/aktuell/finanzen/anleihen-zinsen/kreditversicherungen-praemien-
deutscher-papiere-steigen-stark-11115152.html
31 See ECB Financial Stability Review, June 2011, pp. 72–73.
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and thereby the effective conduct of monetary policy.32 This argument is
solid because the ECB-Statute explicitly empowers the ECB to pursue in-
termediate monetary objectives (Art. 12.1 ECB-Statute), for instance the
smooth functioning of the monetary transmission mechanism. When the
ECB decided to reactivate the SMP in summer 2011 its argumentation re-
mained basically the same.
But given the clear hierarchy of its policy objectives, as enshrined in Art. 127
(1) TFEU, the ECBmust assure that conducting intermediatemonetary policy
objectives does not have a negative impact on price stability. For price stability
is clearly the per-dominant monetary objective. Only if price stability is not
going to be negatively effect, shall the ECB support the general economic
policies of the EuropeanUnion (Art. 2 ECB-Statute). However, it is clear from
the outset that each sovereign bond-buying programme of a central bank
extents the total amount of money in circulation if no effective counter meas-
ure is taken. That is why the Federal Reserve calls its bond-buying program
“Quantitative Easing”.33 The extra liquidity spread by such programmes puts
price stability, the primary objective of the ECB, naturally at a certain risk. The
ECB is of course aware of this effect. Therefore it underlines – although not in
its formal decision on the SMP34 – that it will “sterilise” the extra liquidity by
withdrawing an equivalent amount of liquidity from money markets every
week it will buy sovereign bonds.35
How can the ECB assure such sterilisation? In order to answer this question
we need to have a closer look at the bunch of permitted monetary operations.
The ECB’s tool box is regulated in its statute (Art. 17–24 ECB-Statute36) and
divided into standard and non-standard operations. Sovereign bond-buying
can only be qualified as a non-standard measure by which the ECB acts as a
liquidity provider of last resort for sovereign bond markets. The standard
operations comprise open market and credit transactions. Here the ECB acts
as a liquidity provider of last resort for banks. With regard to the governance
32 Decision of the ECB of 14May 2010 establishing a securities market programme (ECB/
2010/0), Offical Journal EU, 20. 5. 2010 L 124/8 (http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/
l_12420100520en00080009.pdf).
33 See http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/aug/26/bernanke-jackson-hole-speech-
qe
34 Decision of the ECB of 14May 2010 establishing a securities market programme (ECB/
2010/0), Offical Journal EU, 20. 5. 2010 L 124/8 (http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/
l_12420100520en00080009.pdf).
35 Peel/Milne, Bond move deepens EBC divide, FT August 7, 2011 (http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/70dbb426-c103-11e0-b8c2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1mFeLpNbi).
36 The possible operations and instruments are specified in Guidelines of the ECB of 20
September 2011 on monetary policy instruments and procedures of the Eurosystem,
Official Journal EU, 14. 12. 2011, L 331/1.
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of short term liquidity open market transactions and the standing facilities are
essential. Openmarket operations are initiated by the ECB, which also decides
on the instruments to be used and on the terms and conditions for its execu-
tion. The standing facility works different. Here, the financial institutions take
the initiative if they need the ECB as a provider of overnight liquidity. Under
normal circumstances, there are no credit limits or other restrictions on coun-
ter-parties’ access to the facility apart from the requirement to present suffi-
cient underlying assets. All these operations have the effect to extend the total
mount of money in circulation.
So how can the ECB withdraw liquidity from money markets? On a weekly
basis, there are basically two ways to reduce the extra liquidity generated by
the bond-buying programme. The ECB can (theoretically) reduce the tender
volume of the main refinancing instrument and/or it can collect fixed term
deposits. The latter is qualified as a fine tuning operation in the terms of the
Guidelines of the ECB on monetary policy instruments and procedures of the
Eurosystem.37 Confronted with a disturbed interbank market the ECB uses
basically the second way to absorb the extra liquidity generated by means of
buying sovereign bonds in secondary markets. So far this strategy has been
working pretty well. Due to the lack of confidence among private banks the
interbank market for cash deposits dried up and consequently the demand for
central bank cash deposits is huge.
However, there is no guarantee how long and to what extend this previously
untested ECB intervention will work. Despite the strong opposition from
(Ex) German central bankers, particularly Otmar Issing38, Axel Weber39 and
37 See ECB/2011/14, No. 1.131 (c), Official Journal EU, 14. 11. 2011, L 331/1 (http://
www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/l_33120111214en000100951.pdf)
38 Issing, Slithering to the wrong kind of Union, Financial Times, 8. 8. 2011: “A monetary
unionwith a stable euro can only survive if central bank independence is fully respected.
This implies that the ECB abstains from fiscal policy actions (such as the SMP). Yet to
change the “no bail-out” clause ever more in the direction of a bail-out regime is not a
step towards a democratically-legitimised political union. (. . .) The implied transfer
of taxpayers’ money would also take place without the involvement of national par-
liaments – a clear violation of the fundamental democratic principle “no taxation with-
out representation”. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c4159b34-c1a8-11e0-acb3-00144
feabdc0.html#axzz1mBilTevU
39 Weber, Monetary policy after the crisis: A European perspective, 12. 10. 2010: “There is
no evidence that asset purchases have had any significant impact on average euro-area
sovereign bond yields on which euro-area monetary policy must exclusively focus as its
main transmission channel. But the SMP risks blurring the different responsibilities
between fiscal and monetary policy. As the risks associated with the SMP outweigh
its benefits, these securities purchases should now be phased out permanently as part of
our non-standard policy measures.” (http://www.bundesbank.de/download/presse/
reden/2010/20101012.weber.somc.en.php).
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Jürgen Stark40, but also current Bundesbank President Jens Weidemann41, one
has to concede that the large majority of the ECB’s Governing Council re-
peatedly voted in favour of the SMP. It follows from the ECB’s independence
and its decision making process, as laid down in the ECB statute, that the
institution as such enjoys a kind of “business judgment rule” when taking
monetary policy decision. In the light of this rule, which is derived from the
principle of independence, it seems appropriate to conclude that the SMP can
in deed be justified on the basis of Art. 127 (2) TFEU, Art. 12.1 (2) and
Art. 18.1 ECB-Statute.42 However, if the ECB will – for whatever reason –
re-sell the purchased sovereign bonds at a loss to the EFSF, the ESM or the
issuer this would have to be considered as monetary financing.43
Not surprisingly, the President of the ECB and the majority of its Governing
Council did not feel comfortable with its controversial SMP. It was considered
40 Elliot, ECB reveals 22bn cost of bond rescue, The Guardian, 15. 8. 2011: “The ECB
reactivated its securities market programme (SMP) after leaving it dormant for 19
weeks, despite opposition from a group on the bank’s policymaking governing council,
led by Germans Jens Weidmann and Jürgen Stark.” (http://www.guardian.co.uk/busi-
ness/2011/aug/15/european-central-bank-bonds); see also “The European Central
Bank – Ready for the ruck?, The Economist, 22. 10. 2011 (http://www.economist.
com/node/21533368) and http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/08/us-ecb-weid
mann-idUSTRE7A74G120111108.
41 Atkins/Sandbu, FT Interview Transcript: JensWeidmann, 13. 11. 2011: “The ECBGov-
erning Council has always stressed that the Securities Markets Programme is about
ensuring the monetary policy transmission process. But it comes with risks. The risks
are reflected in our balance sheet. There’s also a risk that you mute the incentives that
come from the market. Recent experience has shown that market interest rates do play a
role in pushing governments towards reforms. You have seen that in the case of Italy
quite clearly. We have a mandate and we have to stick to our mandate. Fixing an interest
rate for a country is certainly not compatible with our mandate. You would guarantee a
certain refinancing cost for a government and you could not argue that this was not
monetary financing. The stated purpose of the SMP is to cope with dysfunctional
markets and it’s not to ensure a specific spread for a specific country.” (http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b3a2d19e-0de4-11e1-9d40-00144feabdc0.htm-
l#axzz1mBoB3GTD)
42 Same conclusion is taken byHerrmann, EZB-Programm für die Kapitalmärkte verstößt
nicht gegen die Verträge EuZW 2010, 645; different but with poor and polemic argu-
ments Seidel, Der Ankauf nicht markt- und börsengängiger Staatsanleihen, namentlich
Griechenlands, durch die Europäische Zentralbank und durch nationale Zentralbanken
– nur rechtlich fragwürdig oder Rechtsverstoß?, EuZW 2010, 521.
43 Mario Draghi, Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A) and tran-
script of the questions asked and the answers given by Mario Draghi, President of the
ECB, and Vítor Constâncio Vice-President of the ECB, 9 February 2012 (http://
www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120209.en.html): “It depends, if you make
a loss on the sales (to the FSFS which he sates is “like a government”) that is monetary
financing.”
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rather as an inevitable evil than a second best policy tool. Therefore Jean
Claude Trichet exerted in summer 2011 a lot of pressure on Euro Area Mem-
ber States to construct the permanent ESM and reform the EFSF in such a way
that the two rescue funds are empowered to intervene directly in secondary
sovereign bond markets. In one of his last press conferences as ECB President
Mr. Trichet said on 4th August 201144: “Of course, what we expect is that the
EFSF, which will have the capacity to intervene in the secondary markets, will
be effective and efficient in its interventions. That would permit us not to have
to intervene to help restore more appropriate monetary policy transmission.”
III. The ECB’s role in relation to the modified EFSF and the future ESM
1. The legal basis of the EFSF and the ESM
The legal basis of the EFSF and the ESMwas created in March 2011 through a
European Council Decision amending Art. 136 TFEU.45 The amendment is
based on Art. 48 (6) TEU which allows the European Council, acting by una-
nimity after consulting the European Parliament, the Commission and, in cer-
tain cases, the EuropeanCentral Bank, to adopt a decision amending all or part
of theprovisionsofPartThreeof theTreatyon theFunctioningof theEuropean
Union (TFEU). Subject to the amendment the following paragraph was added
to Article 136 TFEU: “3. The Member States whose currency is the euro may
establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the
stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial
assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.”
Although the amendment was specifically designed to provide a legal justifi-
cation in EU primary law it is questionable if this has been done in a legiti-
mised way. Given the fact that both, the EFSF and ESM, are creating new
financial obligations for the Member States of the Euro Area, that have no
other objective then to help Euro AreaMember States in financial distress, one
can hardly deny that this is conflicting with the original idea of the no bail out
clause (Art. 125 TFEU).46 This conflict caused by the amendment of the TFEU
44 Transcript of the questions asked and the answer given by Jean Claude Trichet, Presi-
dent of the ECB, 4. 8. 2012 (http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2011/html/is110804.
en.html).
45 European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 (2011/199/EU) Official Journal of the
EU, 6. 4. 2011, L 91/1.
46 However Art. 125 TFEU cannot be interpreted as a prohibition of financial assistance
granted to a EuroAreaMember State. Although this is widely and clearly accepted there
are some isolated opponents like Seidel, Die “No-Bail-Out”-Klausel des Art. 125
AEUV als Beistandsverbot, EuZW 2011, 529–530.
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appears particularly problematic when taking into consideration that the sim-
plified process to amend the TFEU, offered by Art. 48 (5) TEU, can not be
used to increase the competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties.
However, from a purely technical point of view neither the treaties establish-
ing/modifying the EFSF nor the treaty establishing the ESM confer new
competences on institutions of the EU because both rescue funds stand out-
side EU primary law. However, it is clear from the outset that they both have a
severe impact on the functioning of the Monetary Union. In fact they deepen
that Union and pave the way to a Fiscal Union. Consequently the rescue
funds, particularly the permanent ESM, should be converted, as soon as pos-
sible, into a permanent institution established and regulated within the TFEU.
The current design as a intergovernmental institution outside primary law
does not fit into the institutional setting of the European Union. The logical
consequences are political and legal (if not juridical) conflicts about the rela-
tionship between the rescue fund and the existing institutions of the European
Treaties and its provisions.47
One can go even one step further and raise the following question: If the ESM
is not a European institutions in the sense of the TEU and the TFEU why do
we need the new Section 3 of Article 136 TFEU? Well, in my opinion simply
because Euro Area Member States wanted to have a pro forma legal justifica-
tion for the de facto violation of the no bail out clause. In order to return to a
consistent and legitimised legal framework for the existingMonetaryUnion as
well as for the emerging Fiscal Union it is indispensible to continue struggling
for a classical long-track reform of the European Treaties which aims to in-
tegration the permanent rescue fund into the ordinary institutional setting.
2. The ECB’s function under the reformed EFSF-Agreement
and the ESM-Treaty
Subject to Art. 13 (1) ESM-Treaty the procedure for granting stability support
to an ESMMember starts as such: “theChairperson of the Board ofGovernors
(of the ESM) shall entrust the European Commission, in liaison with the ECB,
with the following tasks: (a) to assess the existence of a risk to the financial
stability of the euro area as awhole or of itsMember States, unless theECB has
already submitted an analysis under Article 18(2).”
Consequently the ECB is involved in the initial decision onwhether or not the
key trigger event “risk to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole” as
contained inArt. 136 (3) TFEU is fulfilled. Thewording “in liaison” confers to
47 For the position of UK Prime Minister David Cameron see http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-politics-16807226
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the ECB a stronger position than the ordinary right to be consulted48: the ECB
and the Commission are put on equal food print and consequently can only
decide on the basis of a consensus on the existence of the specified risk level. If
the essential precondition, the specified risk level, is given and the ESM de-
cides to arrange for operations on the secondarymarket in relation to bonds of
an ESM Member State, the role of the ECB becomes even more prominent.
Art. 18 (2) ESM-Treaty states that the decisions to address contagion through
secondary market intervention shall be taken on the basis of an analysis of the
ECB recognising the existence of exceptional financial market circumstances
and risks to financial stability. Hence, it is the ECB only who decides on this
issue. The intervention mechanism under the reformed EFSF Framework
Agreement looks basically the same.49
Consequently it is the ECB, who can pull the trigger for secondary market
intervention. This key function is a logical consequence of the emergence of
the EFSF-Reform and the ESM-Treaty. Originally it was not planned to give
the modified EFSF and the ESM the power to intervene in secondary mar-
kets, just primary market intervention was on the agenda. It was only after
continuous pressure from the ECB that the Member States of the Euro Area
agreed on the occasion of their July 2011 summit to add secondary market
intervention to the toolbox of the rescue fund. That explains why Mr. Trichet
highlighted this feature of the institutional reform during the ECB’s first
press conference after the summit. He stated that the revised EFSF (and
the ESM) will replace the ECB’s bond-buying programme.50 And indeed,
the described mechanism of the up-graded EFSF- and the new ESM-Treaty,
correspond to Mr. Trichet’s statement. Theoretically the EFSF and ESM are
enabled to substitute the ECB as liquidity provider of last resort for the
sovereign bond markets while the ECB retains the power to free or veto
such an intervention.
48 Zilioli/Selmayr, The Constitutional Status of the European Central Bank, CML Rev.
2007, 355, 381–386.
49 See Preamble 2: “purchase of bonds in the secondary markets on the basis of an ECB
analysis recognizing the existence of exceptional financial market circumstances and
risks to financial stability or facilities for the purchase of bonds in the primary market”,
and Art. 2 (1) (b): “Financial Assistance to a euro-area Member State may consist of
facilities for the purchase of bonds in the secondary market to avoid contagion, on the
basis of an ECB analysis recognising the existence of exceptional financial market
circumstances and risks to financial stability or by way of facilities for the purchase
of bonds in the primary market.” (http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/20111019_
efsf_framework_agreement_en.pdf).
50 Transcript of the questions asked and the answer given by Jean Claude Trichet, Presi-
dent of the ECB, 4. 8. 2012 (http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2011/html/is110804.
en.html).
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However, at least three important questions remain open: Will the modified
EFSF and/or the ESM clean up the ECB’s balance sheet? What happens if the
EFSF and the ESM turn out to be too small? Are we on the way to an illegal
bail-out regime?
3. Will the ESM/EFSF clean up the ECB’s balance sheet?
Theoretically the ESM and/or the EFSF could buy sovereign bonds from the
ECB and thereby clean up the bank’s balance sheet that has been spoiled with
sovereign “junk bonds” in the course of the SMP. But both, the modified
EFSF-Treaty and the new ESM-Treaty, are silent on this issue. And given
the limited resources of the rescue funds it seems very unlikely that the funds
will purchase sovereign junk bonds from the ECB in order to clean up its
balance sheet. In contrast, the ECB might be forced to participate in a “vol-
untary” haircut that will be arranged for the sovereign bonds of Greece.51
Hence, the risk created by the SMP is likely to materialise for the ECB and
its owners, the Member States of the Euro Area.52
4. What happens if the EFSF and the ESM turn out to be too small?
As a matter of fact, neither the enlarged EFSF nor the ESM, as established by
the ESM-Treaty signed on January2012, have sufficient funds to shield Italy
and/or Spain. This lack of firepower was evident from the outset and clearly
addressed by the President of the IMF.53 Consequently the ESM Member
States agreed to incorporate a “fine tuning” clause in the ESM-Treaty. Recital
(6) of the ESM-Treaty states54: “The initial maximum lending volume of the
ESM is set at EUR 500 000 million, including the outstanding EFSF stability
support. The adequacy of the consolidated ESM and EFSF maximum lending
volume will, however, be reassessed prior to the entry into force of this Treaty.
If appropriate, it will be increased by the Board of Governors of the ESM, in
accordance with Article 10, upon entry into force of this Treaty.” Referring to
this clause several representatives of ESM Member States announced, when
signing the ESM-Treaty in January, that on the occasion of their next summit
51 See http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article13855765/Griechen-Umschuldung-kostet-
Deutsche-25-Milliarden.html
52 See above II 1.
53 See http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/52dcc61a-459f-11e1-93f1-00144feabdc0.html#
axzz1mFeLpNbi and http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/iwf-chefin-fordert-auf
stockung-des-esm-lagarde-setzt-merkel-unter-druck-1.1264793
54 See http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/esm_treaty_en.pdf.
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in March, 2012 it could already be decided that the EFSF and the ESM will
operate parallel in order to raise the total amount of available rescue funds.
Due to the lack of politically realistic alternatives to increase the funds, this
dualism seems to be a probable scenario.
A possible alternative could be to leverage the equity capital of ESM through a
banking licence. This idea was discussed extensively in autumn 2011, but was
rejected by several Euro Area Member States, particularly by Germany. At
least for the moment (beginning of 2012) this idea disappeared from the agen-
da. Turning the ESM into a bank would allow the permanent recue fund to
engage in reversed or secured transactions with the ECB. By using sovereign
bonds bought in the primary or secondary market as collateral the ESM could
easily multiply its funds, because the security threshold (called haircut or over-
collateralisation) on sovereign bonds used as collateral in reversed or secured
transactions is low.55However, such leverage techniques would result in a huge
risk for the ECB and misuse it for the financing of governments. The ECB
itself highlights this potential misuse in its Opinion on the draft European
Council Decision amending Art. 136 TFEU56: “With respect to the role of the
ECB and the Eurosystem (. . .) Article 123 TFEUwould not allow the ESM to
become a counterparty of the Eurosystem under Article 18 of the Statute of
the ESCB. On this latter element, the ECB recalls that the monetary financing
prohibition of Article 123 TFEU is one of the basic pillars of the legal archi-
tecture EuropeanMonetary Union (EMU) both for reasons of fiscal discipline
of the Member States and in order to preserve the integrity of the single
monetary policy as well as the independence of the ECB and the Eurosystem”.
A second possible alternative to raise the firepower of the ESM could be an
increase of its capital. But taking the current political climate into consider-
ation it does not seem very likely that all national parliaments of the ESM
Member States would agree on such an additional increase of their contribu-
tion to the ESM.
Therefore running the EFSF and the ESM parallel seems to be the only avail-
able way to generated volume. The maximum amount of rescue funds that can
be generated by this way will amount roughly to 5750bn. As a matter of fact,
55 In the case of sovereign bond (fixed coupon) with a rating in the range of AAA to A-
(Category I) and a residual maturity between 3 to 5 years the “haircut” applied in a
reversed transaction is only 2.5% calculated on the basis of the market value. See Guide-
lines of the ECB of 20 September 2011 on monetary policy instruments and procedures
of the Eurosystem, Official Journal EU, 14. 12. 2011, L 331/1, 47–48.
56 ECB Opinion of 17 March 2011 on a draft European Council Decision amending
Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a
stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro (CON/2011/24),
Nr. 9.
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even this sum will not be – at least in the perception of market participants –
enough to shield Italy. Eventually it will even be too small for Spain. Con-
sequently if bond yields for these two countries will sharply rise (at the same
time) and the increased prices turn out to be robust, the ECB will once again
get under pressure to intervene itself effectively in secondary markets. Hence,
the establishment of the ESM is no guarantee against a revival of the SMP.
5. Does the ESM create an illegal bail-out regime?
Subject to Art. 8 ESM-Treaty the authorised capital stock of the ESM shall be
EUR 700bn. It shall be divided into seven million shares, having a nominal
value of EUR 100 000 each, which shall be available for subscription according
to the initial contribution key provided for in Article 11 ESM-Treaty and
calculated in Annex I.57 The authorised capital stock shall be divided into
paid-in shares and callable shares. The initial total aggregate nominal value
of paid-in shares shall be EUR 80bnmillion. Shares of authorised capital stock
initially subscribed shall be issued at par. Other shares shall be issued at par,
unless the Board of Governors decides to issue them in special circumstances
on other terms.
By signing the treaty ESM Members irrevocably and unconditionally under-
take to provide their contribution to the authorised capital stock, in accord-
ance with their contribution key in Annex I. They shall meet all capital calls on
a timely basis in accordance with the terms set out in this Treaty. The Board of
Governors may call in authorised unpaid capital at any time and set an ap-
propriate period of time for its payment by the ESM Members (Art. 9 (1)
ESM-Treaty). The liability of ESM Members is limited to the subscribed
capital.
ConcerningGermany this capitalization structuremeans that in theworst case
EUR 190bn will be lost. This maximal loss will arise if the ESM has used the
total amount of its capital stock to help distressed ESM-Member States to
refinance (“roll”) their sovereign debts, and if nevertheless these member
states later one go into a default. However, history taught us, that sovereign
defaults do not end with a zero payment. But haircuts of 50% to 70% are not
unusual.58 Hence, participating in the ESM creates the risk of a significant loss.
In a simplified way this risk may be described as follows: Helping a distressed
ESM Member State by refinancing (“rolling”) its debt, means first of all that
57 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/52dcc61a-459f-11e1-93f1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1
mFeLpNbi
58 Sester, Beteiligung von privaten Investoren im Rahmen des ESM, WM 2011, 1057 ff.
m.w.N.
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ESM funds are used in a moment when the distressed ESMMember State can
no longer roll its accumulated debt by issuing new sovereign bonds in the
market without paying prohibitive high interest rates. Furthermore it means
that the funds of the ESM are used to satisfy the old private sector creditors of
distressed ESMMember States when their claims become due (basically when
the bond maturity ends). In exchange for providing “emergency” liquidity to
satisfy old creditors the ESM becomes the new creditor of the respective ESM
Member State, but at conditions (interest rate, maturity etc.) that do not reflect
the risk level of the debtor in the perception of the market. Last but not least it
means that after “rolling” of the sovereign debt load (accumulate by the dis-
tressed ESMMember States) is completed, it is now the ESM (and its owners)
that bear the full risk of a payment default. This mechanism creates nothing
else but a bail out regime. But a bail-our regime established outside the TEU
and the TFEU. Hence, it does not directly violate these treaties. In contrast,
the new Art. 136 (3) TFEU is providing a legal basis in primary European law
for the establishment of this innovative bail out regime. However, no one can
seriously deny that such a bail out regime violates, at least, the spirit of Art. 125
(1) TFEU.
6. Conclusion
By reforming the EFSF and particularly by establishing the permanent ESM –
not mentioning the new fiscal compact59 – the Euro Area Member States have
materially changed the nature of the Monetary Union and the European
Union as such. Consequently, it is indispensable to integrated the ESM regime
(and the fiscal compact) into the TFEU and clarify the relationship between
the emerging Fiscal Union and the no bail out clause that seems to be no longer
sacrosanct. Art. 136 (3) TFEU, which was introduced 2011 by means of the
simplified Treaty revision process (Art. 48 (4) TFEU), does not provide a
sustainable legitimisation of the bail out regime generated by the ESM-Treaty.
Only a classical treaty change can re-establish legitimacy and guarantee con-
sistency with primary EU law.
However, for the time being such a treaty change seems to be politically out of
reach. Only after the current crisis will have been resolved in the perception of
market participants and voters, will politicians dare to address this issue seri-
ously. Hence, the indispensable treaty change will be part of the post crisis
world. When designing the institutional setting for this post crisis world, one
should not only repair institutional damages of the past, but pave the way for a
true Fiscal Union. Without such a Union it will be impossible to reduce the
59 See http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/579087/treaty.pdf
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severe economical imbalances – as reflected for instance in the TARGET2
system60 and the diverging borrowing conditions61 – between the various Euro
AreaMember States which is widely considered to be the key for the long term
existence of the Monetary Union. A Fiscal Union is not thinkable without a
common sovereign debt instrument: the Eurobonds.
IV. Post crisis world: Fiscal union and eurobonds
How could a possible structure for the issuance of Eurobonds roughly look
like? First of all a European Debt Agency (EDA) needs to be established. Such
an agency could lend money to the 17 member states of the euro area on the
basis of individual loans. In order to get the necessary funds it would issue
bonds in the primary sovereign bond market. All obligations of the EDA
under the bonds would be guaranteed by all 17 euro area member states to
its full amount. Thereby Eurobonds would get a high credit rating, ideally
AAA. In order to coordinate and supervise the borrowing practice of the
involved states a joint fiscal policy institution must be established. Such an
institution should be equipped with strict control and harsh intervention
rights in national budget planning. Hence, national parliaments will loose part
of their budget sovereignty or at least be forced to share it with a European
institution if they breach certain solvency rules (e.g. Debt-to-GDP-ratios). I
doubt that the people of the various Euro Area Member States will (ever) give
legitimacy (by means of a referendum) to such a transfer, if such transfer will
benefit the European Parliament in its current shape. What might be achiev-
able on the medium run is a transfer of budget sovereignty to a new kind of
European Parliament with a federal structure that might be constructed as a
second chamber and composed by representatives of national parliaments or
governments.62
Why could Eurobonds work? The public finances of the Euro Area as a whole
look quite respectable, at least when compared with the US, Japan and the
UK.63
60 See the controversial statement by Sinn, Das unischtbare Bail-out der EZB (http://
www.oekonomenstimme.org/artikel/2011/06/das-unsichtbare-bail-out-der-ezb/)
61 ECB Financial Stability Review, June 2011, pp. 69–77
62 For thoughts that go in the a similar direction see for instance Peel, Germany and
Europe: A very federal formula, Financial Times, 9. 2. 2012 (http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/0/31519b4a-5307-11el-950d-00144feabdc0.html).
63 IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2011).
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% of GDP 2010 2011 2012 2013
US 91.6 99.5 102.9 105.6
UK 77.2 83.0 86.5 87.4
Japan 220.3 229.1 233.4 238.0
Euro Area 85.0 87.3 88.3 88.4
Furthermore by means of Eurobonds one could create the 2nd or 3rd largest
sovereign bondmarket in the world. Such amarket would be very liquid by its
sheer size. And increased liquidity has a positive effect on bond yields.64
Furthermore the enormous volume of such a market would make the life of
downwards speculators much harder.
Consequently Eurobonds could contribute to a sustainable solution of the
current imbalances, thereby allowing the ECB to focus on monetary policy
only. But before the first Eurobond can be issued in a responsible manner by a
future EDA there are some important preconditions to accomplish. First of all
the heavily over-indebted countries need to downsize their debt level. Tough
financial adjustment programmes and measures to increase global competi-
tiveness (deregulation of labour markets) are necessary but not sufficient.
Particularly countries like Greece and Portugal will need to develop a new
creditable business model. However, in the case of these highly indebted
countries haircuts on issued debt instruments will be indispensable before
these countries can participate in the issuance of Eurobonds. Furthermore it
is important to break the vicious circle of sovereign debt and bank restructur-
ing. This can only be achieved if regulatory incentives for banks to buy sov-
ereign bonds without a true risk evaluation are abolished.65
Last but not least safeguards against moral hazard must be established. One
potential safeguard against moral hazard, expected particularly (but not only)
from countries with a history of lax fiscal discipline, could be a veto right for
AAA states. However, it does not seem to be very realistic that the 17 Euro
Area Member States will ever agree on a veto right. Furthermore such a veto
right for a small club of countries does not really fit into the basic concept of
the EUwhere all Member States have equal rights and duties. And last but not
least, it is doubtful if government of AAA states would really dare to make use
of their individual veto-right when they should: The decisive moment will
often come in good economic times when politicians feel comfortable to
64 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/consultation/stability_bonds/pdf/green-
pepr-stability-bonds_en.pdf
65 Micossi/Carmassi/Peirce, CEPS Policy Brief, On the Tasks of the European Stability
Mechanism, No. 235, 8 March 2011.
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borrow excessively. Therefore an effective solution for the moral hazard pro-
blem can only be a market based solution.66
Such a solution is provided by the famous blue-bond-red-bond proposal de-
veloped by Delpla and von Weizsäcker.67 Subject to that proposal the 17 Euro
Area Member States can only finance part of their sovereign debt by means of
Eurobonds: the blue bonds. The financing of the other part would depend on
their individual ability to place red bonds in the primary sovereign bond
market. The red bond volume of each Member State would be limited to
60% of its GDP. The 60%-limit is derived from the so-called Maastricht
criteria68 that almost all euro area member states are violating since years, even
long before the crisis. This limit would guarantee that Eurobondswill (always)
enjoy a AAA rating and at the same time it would set a strong incentive to take
the Maastricht criteria finally serious. The effectiveness of this marked based
safeguard against moral hazard (“lax fiscal discipline on the expenses of serious
member states”) could be enhanced by a standardized subordination clause to
be included in all red bonds. Such a clause could oblige the issuer to use all its
funds to fully serve its obligation under the blue bonds before using the re-
maining funds to serve its obligations under the red bonds. The subordination
rule would become effective once a defined trigger event occurs (for instance
the breach of a bond covenant related to a certain Debt-to-GDP-Ratio).
It is clear from the outset that such a concept would not work for states which
currently have a Debt-to-GDP-Ratio of more than 100%. That is why these
countries need to bring down their debt load before they can join the post
crisis world of Eurobonds. However, all Euro Member States should work
hardly and jointly to build this world, because only a Fiscal Union based
among other on Eurobonds will be able to re-establish some kind of economic
equilibrium between Euro Area Member States. Without such a new balance
the Monetary Union will fall into parts and thereby harm all its Members and
beyond. However, the future Fiscal Union should not eliminate competition
(between member states and European regions). Instead it should use market
forces to discipline “big spenders” among politicians all around Europe and
not rely on shiny promises and constitutional debt brakes only. It is not about
full equalization of taxation and borrowing conditions, but about stronger
convergence. A federal structure like the one of Switzerland and its Cantons
with a well functioning Monetary, Fiscal and Political Union, but a disciplin-
ing tax competition could serve as a model.
66 See in this context Issing, Die Währungsunion im Spannungsfeld von Politik und Öko-
nomie, EWS 2011, 257, 260.
67 Depla/von Wezsächer, brugelpolicybrief, issue 2010/03, The blue bond proposal,
(http://www.bruegel.org/publications/).
68 Art. 126 (2) TFEU and Art. 1 Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0201:0328:EN:PDF
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